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 In two decisions of the 1940s,  Cantwell v. Connecticut 1 and  Everson v. Board 
of Education , 2 the Supreme Court foreshadowed the dominant role that it 
would play in defi ning the relationship between religion and government 
in the contemporary United States. In these cases, the court offered new and 
important interpretations of the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
(the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses), which state that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof.” Notably, the court ruled that these provi-
sions, applicable by their terms only to the federal government, henceforth 
would be applied to the states as well, including their local subdivisions.  In 
so holding, the court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
explicitly addresses the states, incorporated the First Amendment’s reli-
gion clauses by reference . The court earlier had ruled likewise concerning 
the First Amendment’s free speech provisions, meaning that after  Cantwell 
and  Everson , the states effectively were bound by the First Amendment no 
less than the federal government. 
 Cantwell , decided in 1940, protected the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses to 
promote their faith through sidewalk evangelism and soliciting in a heavily 
Roman Catholic neighborhood, even though their appeals included pro-
vocative and strongly worded attacks on the Catholic religion. Invalidating 
the Connecticut laws under which the defendants had been convicted, the 
Supreme Court cited not only the Free Exercise Clause, which specifi cally 
addresses religion, but also the Free Speech Clause, which more generally 
forbids laws that “abridg[e] the freedom of speech.”  Cantwell set the stage 
for a series of Supreme Court decisions addressing questions of religious 
liberty, especially the liberty of religious minorities, in cases arising under 
the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses . 
 31 
 Religion, Government, and Law in 
the Contemporary United States 
 Daniel O.  Conkle 
  1  310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
  2  330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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 In the court’s 1947 decision in  Everson , by contrast, the question was 
whether the government had gone too far in the other direction, promot-
ing religion to the point of creating a forbidden establishment. The fi rst 
of many modern cases challenging fi nancial aid programs,  Everson narrowly 
approved a state and local program of bus-fare reimbursement that extended 
to children attending Roman Catholic schools. Even so, in an often-quoted 
and infl uential passage, the court announced a broad and strongly separa-
tionist interpretation of the Establishment Clause:
 Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither 
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion 
over another. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, 
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. . . . In the 
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was 
intended to erect “a wall of separation between church and State .” 3 
 In a long line of subsequent decisions, the court has addressed Establishment 
Clause challenges in a variety of contexts. In some cases the court has vig-
orously enforced the “wall of separation,” but in others it has permitted a 
considerable degree of church-state interaction. 
 More generally, the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the First 
Amendment have evolved since the 1940s, in part as the result of broader 
religious, cultural, and political developments. In terms of religious con-
troversies, the decade of the 1950s was relatively quiet for the court, as for 
the country. But beginning in the turbulent 1960s and continuing into the 
1980s, the court tended toward aggressive interpretations of the religion 
clauses. It suggested that the religion clauses might demand a capacious 
defi nition of religion, one that encompasses nontheistic moral perspectives. 
Further, its interpretations offered distinctive constitutional protection to 
religious free exercise and often demanded a strict separation of church and 
state. More recently, by contrast, in the continuing wake of the Reagan rev-
olution, the Supreme Court has embraced more conservative and restrained 
judicial sensibilities. As a result, it has adopted more relaxed constitutional 
standards. The court has continued to invalidate laws that discriminate 
against or in favor of religion, either in imposing regulatory burdens or 
in conferring tangible or symbolic benefi ts. But it increasingly has upheld 
nondiscriminatory laws that proceed “neutrally” with respect to religion, 
even if the laws, in actual operation, have the effect of imposing a burden 
or conferring a benefi t on religious practices. 
 This essay begins by addressing the Supreme Court’s attempts to pro-
vide a legal defi nition of religion. It then discusses the court’s wavering 
  3  Id. at 15–16. 
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path of decisions confronting the issues introduced by  Cantwell – the 
 protection of religious exercise and religious speech – along with con-
gressional attempts to “restore” religious freedom after the court repu-
diated earlier constitutional standards. Thereafter, the essay turns to 
Establishment Clause developments since  Everson , including Supreme 
Court decisions concerning religion and the public schools, religious sym-
bolism in other settings, and fi nancial aid to religious schools and orga-
nizations. It also discusses related political developments, including, for 
example, the “Faith-Based Initiative” of President George W. Bush. In 
addressing these various issues, the essay focuses on the direct intersec-
tion of religion and law in the contemporary United States. 4 In closing, 
however, the essay briefl y highlights a range of broader legal and political 
developments and notes their relationship to the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment rulings. 
 DEFINING “RELIGION” 
 In earlier historical periods, the “religion” of the religion clauses seem-
ingly was confi ned to theistic perspectives, and Christianity in particu-
lar appeared to have special constitutional status. Religion entailed duties 
owed to God, nothing more and nothing less. And it was broadly under-
stood that one form of theism, Christianity, was entitled to political and 
legal support as the favored, if not established, religion. Justice Joseph 
Story captured the general sentiment of the Founders: “that Christianity 
ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was not incom-
patible with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious 
worship. An attempt to level all religions . . . would have created universal 
disapprobation, if not universal indignation.” 5 A similar understanding 
prevailed throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. 
In 1892, for example, on the basis of its survey of American law and cul-
ture, the Supreme Court declared that “this is a Christian nation.” 6 And 
some forty years later, in 1931, the court offi cially reaffi rmed that “we are 
a Christian people.” 7 
 This sort of language soon disappeared from judicial opinions, however, 
and there was in the twentieth century a gradual but dramatic shift of 
  4  In so doing, the essay draws upon the author’s more comprehensive discussion and legal 
analysis in Daniel O. Conkle,  Constitutional Law: The Religion Clauses , 2nd ed. (New 
York,  2009 ). 
  5  Joseph Story,  Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States , 5th ed. (Boston, 1891), 
vol. 2 (1874), 630–1. 
  6  Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States , 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). 
  7  United States v. MacIntosh , 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931). 
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thinking. Driven by changing religious demographics and evolving values, 
the American understanding of religious liberty eventually rejected the 
idea of legally sanctioned Christian dominance, embracing instead a vig-
orous requirement of equality between and among all religions. Beyond 
that, the very concept of “religion” was tested by America’s ever-expanding 
religious and moral pluralism . 
 The Supreme Court confronted these new realities in a 1965 case, 
decided in the midst of the Vietnam War, which included a compulsory 
military draft. In  United States v. Seeger , 8 the court interpreted a statutory 
religious liberty provision that protected religious objectors to military 
service. In its defi nition of religion, the statute referred to “an individual’s 
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those 
arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, 
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” To 
earlier generations, this defi nition would have seemed entirely unexcep-
tional. But by 1965, it seemed problematic – so much so that the court 
saw fi t to rewrite the defi nition, through creative statutory interpretation, 
to include any “sincere and meaningful” belief that “occupies a place in 
the life of its possessor parallel to that fi lled by the orthodox belief in God 
of one who clearly qualifi es for the exemption.” So understood, the defi ni-
tion included the beliefs of a conscientious objector who acknowledged his 
skepticism concerning the existence of God but who claimed a “belief in 
and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious 
faith in a purely ethical creed.” 9 Indeed, as the court held in a later deci-
sion, the defi nition likewise extended to an objector who had stricken the 
word “religious” from his application and who had declared that his beliefs 
were not religious in any conventional sense . 10 
 Seeger ’s expansive, “parallel position” understanding of religion – an 
understanding that included deeply held moral beliefs that were not 
 theistic – refl ected the rapidly changing character of religion in the United 
States. As the court observed, American religion was remarkably diverse 
by the 1960s, and it extended well beyond the traditional confi nes of 
Christianity and Judaism. Perhaps more important, modern theology was 
transforming certain strands of the traditional faiths themselves . The court 
noted, for example, that the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich had con-
cluded that God should no longer be understood “as a projection ‘out there’ 
or beyond the skies but as the ground of our very being.” And “if that word 
[God] has not much meaning for you,” Tillich explained, “translate it, and 
  8  380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
  9  Id. at 166. 
  10  Welsh v. United States , 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
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speak of the depths of your life, and the source of your being, of your ulti-
mate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation .” 11 
 Although infl uenced by constitutional considerations,  Seeger rested on 
statutory, not constitutional, interpretation. In subsequent decisions, the 
Supreme Court sometimes has suggested that it might adopt a more nar-
row approach in other legal contexts. Indeed, an overly broad constitu-
tional defi nition of religion could render religious liberty unmanageable 
in an era of pervasive government, because the government, of necessity, 
frequently burdens or favors particular moral perspectives. Even so, the 
 Seeger defi nition may be fi tting at least for the Free Exercise Clause, which 
addresses claims of constitutional protection for conscience-based acts or 
abstentions. In fact, since the 1960s we have seen an ever-increasing reli-
gious and moral diversity in the United States, both within and outside the 
traditional religious faiths, arguably making the court’s reasoning in  Seeger 
even more compelling today . 
 In any event, it is quite clear that the religion clauses’ core protection 
of  belief and profession (as opposed to conscience-driven acts or abstentions) 
today reaches well beyond its historical boundaries. In a 1985 decision, 
the court explained the contemporary scope of an individual’s “freedom to 
choose his own creed” and “his right to refrain from accepting the creed 
established by the majority.” 
 At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed the preference 
of one Christian sect over another, but would not require equal respect for 
the conscience of the infi del, the atheist, or the adherent of a non- Christian 
faith such as Islam or Judaism. But when the underlying principle has 
been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court has unambigu-
ously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by 
the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or 
none at all. 12 
 As society changes, so does the law. And the realm of religion and con-
science that is respected and valued in contemporary America – in law and 
society alike – plainly is not confi ned to past understandings . 
 FREE EXERCISE AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
 From the 1960s to the present, the United States has witnessed the rise, 
fall, and partial reinstatement of vigorous legal protection for the free exer-
cise of religion. Building upon its 1940 decision in  Cantwell , the Supreme 
  11  Seeger , 380 U.S. at 180, 187, quoting Paul Tillich,  The Shaking of the Foundations 
(New York, 1948), 57. 
  12  Wallace v. Jaffree , 472 U.S. 38, 52–3 (1985). 
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Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause expansively in the 1960s and 
1970s.  The court later changed course, and its 1990 decision in  Employment 
Division v. Smith 13 dramatically curtailed the constitutional protection that 
had previously been in place . Congress responded to  Smith with a pair of 
important religious liberty statutes, thereby restoring a measure of pro-
tection for religiously motivated conduct.  In addition, the Supreme Court 
itself, despite  Smith , has increasingly protected one important component 
of religious freedom, religious  speech , through its interpretations of the Free 
Speech Clause . 
 THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
 The Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Free Exercise Clause 
 typically have involved religion in a conventional and indisputable sense, 
obviating the need for defi nitional discussions of the sort undertaken in 
 Seeger . Instead, the court generally has focused on the scope of the clause 
when it is conceded that religion is at stake.  As already suggested, the con-
temporary Free Exercise Clause protects, at a minimum, the freedom to 
believe or disbelieve, and to profess or not, as one sees fi t. Accordingly, reli-
gious tests or oaths cannot be required for state offi ceholders, just as they 
are banned at the federal level by the explicit command of Article VI of the 
original Constitution. As the court explained in its 1961 decision in  Torcaso 
v. Watkins , 14 “neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitution-
ally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’” 15 This 
much today is uncontested and uncontroversial .  But what about religious 
conduct, that is, religiously motivated acts or abstentions going beyond 
mere profession? Is such conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause 
even in the face of legal prohibitions or restrictions? This has been the 
main point of contention in contemporary debates concerning the clause. 
It is a question of fundamental importance in our increasingly pluralistic 
society, especially for religious minorities whose practices may be deliber-
ately or inadvertently impaired by the law, which tends to refl ect conven-
tional, majoritarian sentiments. 
 In early cases, the Supreme Court suggested that the Free Exercise Clause 
offers no protection for religious conduct, apart from religious profession 
or speech. Thus, in its 1879 decision in  Reynolds v. United States , 16 the court 
held that the clause did not protect the Mormon practice of polygamy. 
  13  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
  14  367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
  15  Id. at 495. 
  16  98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
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“Laws are made for the government of actions,” the court wrote, “and while 
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may 
with practices,” lest “every citizen . . . become a law unto himself .” 17 In the 
1960s, by contrast, the Supreme Court rejected this restrictive approach 
and interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to protect religious conduct, that 
is, acts or abstentions that are sincerely motivated by religious beliefs. 
The court recognized that religious conduct, unlike mere belief, cannot be 
absolutely protected, but it ruled that laws substantially burdening reli-
gious conduct would be declared unconstitutional unless they were found 
to serve suffi ciently important or (in constitutional parlance) “compelling” 
governmental interests. 
 From the 1960s through the 1980s, the Free Exercise Clause offered pro-
tection not only from laws that targeted religious conduct for discriminatory 
treatment, but also from nondiscriminatory laws of general applicability. If 
the government could not justify the application of a nondiscriminatory 
law to religious conduct, an exemption from the law was constitutionally 
required. This analysis extended not only to laws that made religious con-
duct illegal, but also to laws that imposed more indirect burdens, burdens 
that discouraged religious conduct by making it diffi cult or costly. 
 The Supreme Court fi rst embraced this expansive interpretation in 
1963, in the seminal case of  Sherbert v. Verner . 18 South Carolina law made 
unemployment compensation available only to those who would accept 
Saturday employment, but the court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause 
demanded an exemption for a Seventh-Day Adventist. Although the law 
did not make her religious practice illegal, the court found that it exerted 
unmistakable pressure on the exercise of religion by offering the claimant 
a fi nancial incentive to violate her Sabbath. The state contended that it had 
a “compelling” interest in avoiding fraudulent religious claims, but the 
court ruled that this did not justify a categorical ban on religious exemp-
tions, even for claimants who were undeniably sincere . 
 In 1972, the Supreme Court issued another important ruling, protecting 
Old Order Amish from the operation of a compulsory education law that 
required parents to send their children to school until the age of sixteen. 
In this case,  Wisconsin v. Yoder , 19 the burden on religious conduct was direct 
and inescapable. Under threat of criminal sanction, the law required the 
Amish to abandon a religious obligation: protecting their children from 
the worldly infl uences of high school. The court recognized Wisconsin’s 
strong interest in education, but it found that requiring Amish children to 
  17  Id. at 166–7. 
  18  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
  19  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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attend one or two years of high school (they attended elementary school) 
would do little to serve that interest, especially since the Amish commu-
nity itself provided an alternative form of education, including informal 
vocational training. Accordingly, the court ruled that the Amish were enti-
tled to an exemption from the law. 
 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court continued to 
endorse the constitutional framework of  Sherbert and  Yoder . Even so, it 
rejected a number of free exercise claims in the 1980s, setting the stage 
for the more dramatic judicial retrenchment that would follow. In  United 
States v. Lee , 20 for instance, the court rejected an exemption sought by the 
Amish from participation in social security, fi nding that the government’s 
interest in a uniform tax system should prevail . In addition, the court 
adopted explicit exceptions to the  Sherbert / Yoder approach for military and 
prison regulations. 21 And it ruled that the Free Exercise Clause did not 
limit the government’s internal operations, including the use of govern-
ment land, no matter the adverse impact on religious practices . In  Lyng 
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association , 22 for example, the court 
found no constitutional impediment to a proposed National Forest road 
that, according to the challengers, would have seriously damaged the sanc-
tity of Native American sacred sites. (The court in  Lyng also rejected a 
claim under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, fi nd-
ing that the act confers no enforceable legal rights.)  Outside these excep-
tional contexts, however, the court continued to apply the  Sherbert / Yoder 
framework, and, indeed, it specifi cally reaffi rmed its decision in  Sherbert in 
 several  comparable cases. 
 Employment Division v. Smith , decided in 1990, marked a clear and con-
troversial turn in the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. In 
 Smith , the court was asked to recognize a free exercise exemption for the 
sacramental use of an otherwise illegal drug, peyote, by members of the 
Native American Church. Not only did the court refuse to do so, but, on a 
fi ve-four vote, it also declined to apply the analysis that  Sherbert and  Yoder 
appeared to require. Although the court purported to distinguish and pre-
serve its particular holdings in those and similar cases, it renounced their 
interpretive underpinnings. Thus, the court declared that nondiscrimina-
tory laws affecting religious conduct do not implicate the Free Exercise 
Clause, do not require special constitutional justifi cation, and do not 
require religious exemptions. Giving new life to its century-old decision 
  20  455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
  21  Goldman v. Weinberger , 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military);  O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz , 482 
U.S. 342 (1987) (prisons). 
  22  485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
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in  Reynolds , the court suggested that to grant a religious exemption would 
be to permit the religious believer, “by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a 
law unto himself,’” a result that “contradicts both constitutional tradition 
and common sense.” 23 
 Although more complex interpretations of the court’s constitutional 
doctrine are possible,  Smith essentially reduced the Free Exercise Clause to 
a prohibition on deliberate discrimination against religion. Accordingly, a 
law burdening religious conduct no longer triggers presumptive constitu-
tional protection unless the law targets that conduct for unequal  treatment. 
As interpreted in  Smith , the Free Exercise Clause no longer protects reli-
gious conscience or voluntarism as an independent value. Instead, it merely 
ensures a type of formal religious equality . 
 In the contemporary period, laws that deliberately discriminate against 
religion are rare, but they are not nonexistent, as became clear in a case 
decided just three years after  Smith . In  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah , 24 the Supreme Court invalidated a series of ordi-
nances that had been adopted by the City of Hialeah, Florida, in a transpar-
ent attempt to stop the establishment and spread of the Santer í a religion, 
which practices animal sacrifi ce as a principal form of devotion. The ordi-
nances effectively outlawed Santer í a animal sacrifi ce even as they left other 
animal killings unaffected. Unlike, for example, a general ban on animal 
killing (which, under  Smith , would raise no free exercise issue), the Hialeah 
ordinances specifi cally targeted Santer í a religious exercise. As a result, the 
ordinances triggered presumptive constitutional protection and rigorous 
judicial scrutiny, and they could not survive that review . 
 CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE-LAW PROTECTIONS 
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 Notwithstanding  Lukumi , the court’s current understanding of the Free 
Exercise Clause offers far less protection to religious believers, including 
religious minorities, than did the pre- Smith approach. Some state courts, as 
a matter of state constitutional law, have rejected the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning and have continued to protect religious conduct from nondiscrim-
inatory laws. In addition, the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation 
of the Free Exercise Clause has generated a remarkable series of legislative 
responses. 
 In its initial reaction to  Smith , Congress concluded that the decision 
gave inadequate protection to religious freedom and, indeed, that the 
  23  Employment Division v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990). 
  24  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012Downloaded from Cambridge Hi tories O line by IP 159.242.236.39 on Mon Nov 11 16:55:33 WET 2013.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521871082.032
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2013
Religion, Government, and Law in the Contemporary United States 657
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause was erroneous. 
Accordingly, Congress attempted to “restore” the legal protection provided 
by the earlier approach of  Sherbert and  Yoder , now as a matter of statutory 
rather than constitutional right. Thus, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 (RFRA) declared that “government shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability” unless the burden “is in furtherance of a compel-
ling governmental interest.” 25 RFRA was supported by a broad coalition of 
divergent interest groups, ranging from the American Civil Liberties Union 
to the Southern Baptist Convention, and it was approved in Congress by 
nearly unanimous votes. But the Supreme Court was not impressed by 
Congress’ attempt effectively to overrule the court, and it responded with 
a 1997 decision dramatically curtailing the statute’s reach. In  City of Boerne 
v. Flores , 26 the court ruled that RFRA violated the Constitution because 
Congress lacked the power to impose the statute’s requirements on state 
and local governments. By contrast, it appears that RFRA remains valid 
as applied to federal laws and practices. In its 2006 decision in  Gonzales v. 
O Centro Espirita Benefi cente Uniao do Vegetal , 27 the Supreme Court not only 
assumed the constitutionality of RFRA in the federal context, but also 
offered a vigorous interpretation of the statutory protection that it affords. 
In so doing, the court unanimously approved an exemption under RFRA 
for a small religious group, indigenous to Brazil, that uses a sacramental 
tea containing a hallucinogen otherwise banned by federal law . 
 In response to  Boerne , some state legislatures enacted state-law versions 
of RFRA to replace the invalidated portion of the federal law. Congress 
initially considered a broad response of its own, but it ultimately enacted a 
more limited statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). RLUIPA reimposed federal, RFRA-like provi-
sions on state and local governments, but only for land use regulations 
and regulations affecting institutionalized persons, including prisoners. 28 
Despite its limited reach, RLUIPA raises signifi cant issues of federalism, 
but it so far has survived – or avoided – constitutional challenges address-
ing these concerns . 
 All of these developments, taken together, mean that the  Sherbert / Yoder 
approach now applies in some legal contexts but not others. It applies to 
federal laws by virtue of RFRA, and it applies to state laws falling within 
the selective coverage of RLUIPA. It also applies if a particular state elects 
  25  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). 
  26  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
  27  546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
  28  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006). 
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to offer this protection as a matter of state law. Otherwise, the restrictive 
approach of  Smith continues to control, confi ning the Free Exercise Clause 
mainly to discriminatory laws . 
 THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELIGIOUS SPEECH 
 Despite  Smith , the contemporary Supreme Court has interpreted the First 
Amendment aggressively with respect to one type of religious conduct, 
religious  speech , which it has protected under the Free Speech Clause. 
Building upon and expanding the free speech component of  Cantwell , the 
court has ruled that private religious speech, including religious worship, 
is entitled to the same free speech protection as core political speech. And 
it has extended its distaste for discrimination to the free speech context, 
issuing a series of rulings granting religious speakers equal access to public 
property even when the government argues that the separation of church 
and state demands their exclusion. Notably, these cases often have involved 
Christian groups, and they have included claims of access to public school 
buildings.  As we will see, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that 
the establishment clause forbids public schools to sponsor prayers or reli-
gious exercises. But the court also has ruled that private religious groups 
have the right to use public school buildings, after hours, on the same 
basis as other private groups. In its 1993 decision in  Lamb’s Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Union Free School District , 29 for example, the court ruled that a pub-
lic school district, having opened its facilities for after-hours use by various 
nonreligious groups, could not bar a religious group from presenting a fi lm 
series promoting “Christian family values .” 
 In a 2001 decision, the court extended its equal access doctrine even to 
after-school religious meetings for elementary students. In  Good News Club 
v. Milford Central School , 30 an evangelical Christian organization requested 
permission to conduct meetings for elementary school students immedi-
ately after school, meetings at which the children would sing songs, hear 
Bible lessons, memorize scripture, and pray. School policy permitted pri-
vately sponsored after-school meetings for various purposes, including 
morals and character education for children, but it prohibited the use of 
school facilities “for religious purposes.” Citing this prohibition as well as 
the Establishment Clause, the school denied the organization’s request. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the school’s policy, as applied to the proposed 
meetings, impermissibly discriminated against religious speech in violation 
of the Free Speech Clause. Contrary to the school’s argument, moreover, the 
  29  508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
  30  533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
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court found that the policy was not redeemed by the Establishment Clause. 
The court reasoned that although public schools cannot themselves pro-
mote religion, this does not occur when schools merely provide the sort 
of nondiscriminatory access that the Christian organization was seeking – 
possible misperceptions to the contrary notwithstanding . 
 The Supreme Court’s equal access doctrine offers protection to Christian 
as well as other religious speakers and groups, and it operates as a limitation 
on the court’s Establishment Clause doctrine. In the equal access context, 
Christian conservatives, among others, have achieved considerable success 
by invoking arguments for equal treatment, which resonate strongly in the 
political and legal culture of the contemporary United States . 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION 
AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 Prayer and Religious Instruction 
 Although the Supreme Court’s equal access decisions protect privately 
sponsored religious speech, even in public school buildings, the court has 
ruled that the Establishment Clause forbids the public schools themselves 
to sponsor or promote religion. Citing the impressionability of children 
and their susceptibility to peer pressure and to the infl uence of teachers and 
other school offi cials, the court has aggressively enforced this prohibition, 
and in this respect the court’s stance has been relatively stable throughout 
the contemporary period. Thus, in a long line of cases from 1948 to the 
present, the Supreme Court has invalidated school-sponsored prayer and 
religious instruction in the public schools, even when student participa-
tion is designated as voluntary.  Apart from its aberrational 1952 decision 
in  Zorach v. Clauson , 31 the court has consistently reasoned that the public 
schools cannot act to favor Christianity, any other religion, or even religion 
in general . In so ruling, the court has protected religious minorities and 
nonbelievers not only from the risk of direct or subtle coercion, but also 
from feelings of exclusion, affront, and alienation. 
 The Supreme Court’s initial encounter with religion and the public 
schools occurred in 1948, only a year after  Everson v. Board of Education . 
In  Everson , the court had declared that the Establishment Clause forbids 
the government to aid either one religion or religion in general. In  Illinois 
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education , 32 the court relied on this principle 
to invalidate a public school program that provided religious instruction 
  31  343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
  32  333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
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through a “released-time” arrangement. Under the program, weekly  classes 
in religious instruction, taught by privately employed religious teachers 
of various faiths, were conducted in the school building during regular 
school hours. The classes were offered only to students whose parents had 
requested that they attend; students not attending continued their secular 
studies. The court noted the challengers’ argument that the program was 
voluntary in name only, and it also noted the fact of compulsory school 
attendance. But the court did not base its decision on coercion. Instead, the 
court ruled that the program of religious instruction was unconstitutional 
because (unlike an equal access program) it singled out religion for special, 
advantageous treatment, promoting religion over irreligion in violation of 
the principle announced in  Everson . 
 Four years later, by contrast, the court in  Zorach v. Clauson upheld a very 
similar program of religious released time. As in  McCollum , the challenged 
program offered weekly religious instruction during regular school hours 
to students whose parents requested that they attend. Unlike in  McCollum , 
however, the religious classes were conducted off the premises of the public 
schools, at religious centers to which the participating students retreated. 
For the court in  Zorach , this made all the difference, because now the  public 
schools were doing “no more than accommodat[ing] their schedules to a 
program of outside religious instruction.” 33 In reality, however, the court’s 
attempt to distinguish  McCollum was tenuous, because the  Zorach program 
still promoted religion over irreligion: aided by compulsory attendance 
laws, the public schools singled out religious instruction, and nothing 
else, for special, preferential treatment. Nevertheless, and despite later 
decisions further undermining its premises,  Zorach has not been overruled. 
Some school districts, especially in rural areas, continue to sponsor off-the-
 premises released-time programs, and such programs are permissible as a 
matter of prevailing constitutional law . 
 In the years since  Zorach , the Supreme Court has consistently and repeat-
edly invalidated laws and policies promoting school-sponsored prayers and 
devotional exercises in the public schools, even if nonsectarian and formally 
voluntary. In its landmark decisions of 1962 and 1963, the court addressed 
the classic form of school-sponsored prayer and devotion: spoken exercises 
in the classroom . In  Engel v. Vitale , 34 the court struck down a program 
that called for teachers to lead their students in a daily, state-prescribed 
prayer. The prayer was brief and nondenominational: “Almighty God, we 
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon 
us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.” In addition, the prayer was 
  33  Zorach , 343 U.S. at 315. 
  34  370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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designated as voluntary; no student who objected was required to partici-
pate. Nonetheless, the court invalidated the prayer .  And in  School District of 
Abington Township v. Schempp , 35 the court extended  Engel to devotional prac-
tices not involving a state-prescribed prayer, including the reading of Bible 
verses to nonobjecting students and their collective recitation of the Lord’s 
Prayer. Justice Stewart, the sole dissenter in  Engel and  Schempp , noted that 
there was no proof of demonstrable coercion in either case. The majority 
of the court, by contrast, was content to note the risk of “indirect coercive 
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing offi cially 
approved religion .” 36 
 Engel and  Schempp were enormously controversial decisions, and the con-
troversy has not died. Critics have pushed for a constitutional amendment, 
but these efforts have failed. Despite ongoing criticism, moreover, the 
Supreme Court has not only reaffi rmed the decisions, but also extended 
them. It has imposed constitutional limits on moments of silence, and it 
has precluded school-sponsored prayers even during graduation ceremonies 
and at extracurricular events, and even when offered by students rather 
than teachers. 
 As one response to  Engel and  Schempp , more than half of the states have 
adopted statutes authorizing moments of silence in the public schools, 
moments that may be used by religious students as a time for silent prayer . 
In its 1985 decision in  Wallace v. Jaffree , 37 however, the court declared that 
moment-of-silence statutes are unconstitutional if they are purposefully 
crafted to promote silent  prayer . In  Wallace , the court invalidated a 1981 
Alabama statute that authorized a period of classroom silence “for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer.” This holding went well beyond  Engel and  Schempp , 
but it did not reach all moment-of-silence laws. As the court explained, 
preexisting Alabama law had already authorized a period of silence “for 
meditation,” and the stark legislative history of the 1981 enactment con-
fi rmed that it was “entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion” by 
“convey[ing] a message of State endorsement and promotion of prayer.” 38 
The court’s opinion suggested that a moment-of-silence law not mention-
ing prayer would be constitutionally permissible. Taking into account the 
views of fi ve justices who wrote concurring and dissenting opinions, more-
over, it appears that the court likewise would have approved a law that did 
mention prayer as one permissible use for a moment of silence – as long as 
the law’s language and history did not reveal the impermissible purpose of 
  35  374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
  36  Engel , 370 U.S. at 431. 
  37  472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
  38  Id. at 56, 59. 
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012Downloaded from Cambridge Hi tories O line by IP 159.242.236.39 on Mon Nov 11 16:55:33 WET 2013.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521871082.032
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2013
Daniel O. Conkle662
favoring silent prayer over other forms of quiet refl ection. In the years since 
 Wallace , lower courts have been left to apply the decision to other moment-
of-silence laws. There have been mixed results in these cases, but most of 
the laws have been upheld and remain in place . 
 After  Wallace , the Supreme Court next confronted a school prayer chal-
lenge in 1992.  Through a series of appointments, Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George H. W. Bush had attempted to move the court in a 
more conservative direction , and there was speculation that the newly con-
stituted court might limit the Establishment Clause to cases involving 
demonstrable coercion, much as Justice Stewart had urged in  Engel and 
 Schempp .  In fact, the court in  Lee v. Weisman 39 did utilize a coercion analysis 
of sorts, but, over the vigorous dissent of four justices, the court nonethe-
less concluded that it was unconstitutional for a public school to sponsor a 
clergy-led, nonsectarian prayer at a graduation ceremony. Unlike the dis-
senting justices, the court took an extremely broad view of illicit govern-
mental coercion. Noting the “subtle coercive pressure” of the public school 
environment and the role of “public pressure, as well as peer pressure,” the 
court found that the school had placed objecting students in an “untenable 
position” of “indirect coercion.” This coercion did not necessarily induce 
objecting students to join the prayer, even silently. But it did subject them 
to “pressure, though subtle and indirect,” to “participate” in a more passive 
way. Thus, they felt obliged to attend the ceremony despite their objection, 
and, once there, they felt obliged to acquiesce quietly in the prayer, giving 
others the impression that they were either joining or approving it . 40 
 In its 2000 decision in  Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe , 41 the 
court applied and extended  Weisman , invalidating a school board policy that 
called for student votes to determine whether there would be a student-led 
“invocation and/or message” before high school football games, in part “to 
solemnize” the games. A six-justice majority found that the policy’s pur-
pose, as revealed by its text and context, was to preserve and promote the 
school district’s longstanding practice of school-sanctioned prayers at the 
games. As in  Weisman , moreover, the court found indirect and subtle coer-
cion even in the absence of compulsory attendance . 
 EVOLUTION AND CREATIONISM 
 At least since the notorious  Scopes trial of the 1920s, 42 there has been tre-
mendous controversy concerning the topic of human origins and how it 
  39  505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
  40  Id. at 590–9. 
  41  530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
  42  See Scopes v. State , 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927). 
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should be taught in the public schools. The Supreme Court has declared 
that the Establishment Clause imposes signifi cant limitations in this 
 context.  In essence, the court has treated creationism as a matter of reli-
gious instruction, bringing into play the same sort of reasoning that the 
court has applied to school-sponsored prayer and religious instruction 
generally. Thus, in its 1968 decision in  Epperson v. Arkansas 43 and its 1987 
decision in  Edwards v. Aguillard , 44 the court invalidated laws that were 
designed to prohibit the teaching of evolution or to promote the teaching 
of creationism. 
 In  Epperson , the court invalidated an Arkansas law that had been enacted 
in 1928, in the aftermath of the  Scopes case. As did the Tennessee law at 
issue in  Scopes , the Arkansas law prohibited public school teachers to teach 
“the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower 
order of animals .” Focusing on the history of the law, the court concluded 
that “fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law’s reason for 
existence” and that the law prohibited the teaching of human evolution 
“for the sole reason that it is deemed to confl ict with a particular religious 
doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis 
by a particular religious group.” 45 As a result, the law had the unconstitu-
tional purpose of advancing religion, and, indeed, a particular religion, by 
protecting that religion from competing views. 
 Going a step beyond  Epperson , the court in  Edwards invalidated a Louisiana 
“balanced treatment” statute. The Louisiana statute did not preclude the 
teaching of evolution, at least not categorically. Rather, it declared that 
any public school that elected to teach evolution was required to teach 
“creation science” as well. The state claimed that creation science refl ected 
legitimate scientifi c opinion that had been improperly repressed, and it 
contended that the statute permitted students to confront the competing 
evidence and decide the matter for themselves. Over a vigorous dissent by 
Justice Scalia, however, the court rejected the state’s arguments and con-
cluded that its secular defense of the statute was a “sham.” The court noted 
that public school teachers are free to teach genuinely scientifi c evidence 
about human origins, even if this evidence might undermine the prevail-
ing theory of evolution, and it suggested that a legislature would be free 
to require that the public schools include this type of scientifi c critique. 
On the basis of the content of the Louisiana statute and its legislative his-
tory, however, the court found that it was not designed to promote the 
teaching of diverse scientifi c theories. Rather, the legislation was adopted 
to advance and endorse a particular religious understanding of creation, an 
  43  393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
  44  482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
  45  Epperson , 393 U.S. at 103, 108. 
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understanding that appeared to be drawn from a literal reading of Genesis. 
As a result, the law was unconstitutional . 
 In recent years, a new line of argument has featured the theory of 
 “intelligent design,” which contends that evolution and natural selection 
are inadequate to explain the biological complexity of life, meaning that 
an intelligent force must be at work. The Supreme Court has not addressed 
intelligent design, but the issue garnered national attention in 2004 when 
the school board of Dover, Pennsylvania, adopted a policy requiring that 
students be informed about this theory in addition to the theory of evolu-
tion. In a broadly written decision (which was not appealed), a federal dis-
trict court invalidated the policy. 46 Although the argument for intelligent 
design does not track the biblical account of creation, the court concluded 
that this argument, like that of creation science before it, is nothing more 
than a veiled attempt to advance a religious understanding of creation. 
Accordingly, under the reasoning of  Epperson and  Edwards , the Dover policy 
was unconstitutional . 
 THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE 
 Public schools routinely sponsor recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance, 
through which students recite the following, congressionally prescribed 
language: “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, 
and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivis-
ible, with liberty and justice for all.” 47 Congress added the “under God” 
language in 1954, during the Cold War, in part to distinguish the United 
States from the Soviet Union. Even before this addition, the Supreme Court 
had ruled in its 1943 decision in  West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette 48 that public schools cannot force objecting students to participate. 
Conversely, it has been widely assumed that schools are free to lead will-
ing students in the pledge. In 2002, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, citing the Establishment Clause, ruled that school-
sponsored recitations of the pledge, even if formally voluntary, could no 
longer include the “under God” language. 49 The court’s holding appeared 
to follow logically from the Supreme Court’s prevailing Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, including its school prayer decisions. Even so, the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision triggered a public outcry, including condemna-
tion by political offi cials of all stripes. The Supreme Court granted review, 
  46  Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District , 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
  47  4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
  48  319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
  49  Newdow v. U.S. Congress , 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 328 F.3d 466 (2003), 
rev’d, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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but the case ended with a whimper when the court avoided a ruling on the 
merits. 
 In  Elk Grove Unifi ed School District v. Newdow , 50 the Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit on procedural grounds, concluding that the 
challenger (a parent with limited and disputed custodial rights) lacked 
“prudential standing” to bring the case in federal court. In a potentially 
infl uential separate opinion, however, Justice O’Connor reached the merits 
and argued that the “under God” reference is permissible. 51 Citing the tra-
dition and ubiquity of the pledge, she noted that the “under God” language 
dates back half a century, and she suggested that its recitation in the  public 
schools has become part of the American social fabric. Distinguishing the 
court’s school prayer decisions, she emphasized that the pledge is not a 
prayer, and its recitation is not a religious exercise. Rather, it is a patriotic 
exercise that includes a brief and general religious reference or declaration. 
As a result, she argued, it is not fatal to the pledge (as it is to a school-
sponsored prayer) that students may feel subtle coercive pressure to partic-
ipate, as long as the school, in line with  Barnette , does not directly compel 
students to join the recitation, either in full or in part. 
 The Pledge of Allegiance issue tests the limits of the Establishment 
Clause in the public school setting. The issue remains unresolved, and it is 
likely to return to the Supreme Court in the future . 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
 Prayer and Religious Symbolism outside the Public School Setting 
 Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court moved beyond the pub-
lic schools to consider claims that the government was improperly pro-
moting prayer and religious symbolism in other settings. In theory, the 
Establishment Clause prohibition is fully applicable here, no less than in 
the public schools, even though here any risk of coercion may be slight. In 
practice, however, the court’s decisions have followed a wavering path, with 
the justices issuing mixed results depending on fi ne distinctions. Mirroring 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in  Newdow , the court sometimes has relied upon 
tradition. Otherwise, it has focused on the particular governmental practice 
under review, asking whether that practice, properly understood, acknowl-
edges or recognizes religion for secular reasons or instead conveys an imper-
missible message of governmental promotion or endorsement, a message 
that might affront and alienate religious minorities and nonbelievers. 
  50  542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
  51  Id. at 33–45 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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 In its 1983 decision in  Marsh v. Chambers , 52 the fi rst ruling in this context, 
the Supreme Court invoked tradition to uphold the practice of legislative 
prayer by publicly paid chaplains. The court emphasized that legislative 
prayer goes back to the First Congress and is such a longstanding tra-
dition that it is “part of the fabric of our society.” 53 On similar grounds, 
the court has suggested that other longstanding practices are likewise per-
missible, including, for example, our national motto, “In God We Trust,” 
and the court’s own opening cry, “God Save the United States and this 
Honorable Court .” 
 In other decisions, the court sometimes has alluded to tradition in a 
more general way, noting the prominent role of religion in American polit-
ical and governmental history, but its decisions generally have turned on a 
fact-specifi c evaluation of the particular practice under review.  A year after 
 Marsh , for example, in  Lynch v. Donnelly , 54 the court upheld the use of a 
nativity scene in a municipal Christmas display that also included a Santa 
Claus house, reindeer, and other secular symbols. According to the court, 
the city was simply celebrating Christmas, a public and heavily secular-
ized holiday, by giving recognition to its various traditional symbols. Five 
years later, however, distinguishing  Lynch , the court in  County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU 55 ruled against a stand-alone nativity scene even as it approved a 
separate display that included a Chanukah menorah, a Christmas tree, and 
a sign promoting liberty . 
 More recently, in 2005, the Supreme Court addressed similar issues 
in highly publicized cases challenging governmental displays of the Ten 
Commandments. The court once again reached mixed results, focusing on 
the particular facts at hand. In  McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky , 56 
a fi ve-justice majority invalidated recently erected courthouse displays of 
framed copies of the Ten Commandments. The commandments were sur-
rounded by the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of 
Rights, and other historical documents, but the current arrangements had 
been preceded by earlier, more limited displays that clearly were designed 
to promote the religious content of the commandments. According to the 
court, the current displays, developed only in response to litigation, still 
conveyed the same, predominantly religious message. In  Van Orden v. Perry , 57 
by contrast, a different fi ve-justice majority upheld the constitutionality of 
a forty-year-old display of the Ten Commandments on the outdoor grounds 
  52  463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
  53  Id. at 792. 
  54  465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
  55  492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
  56  545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
  57  545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
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of the Texas State Capitol, where the commandments stood as one monu-
ment among many in a large, parklike setting. Switching sides as he cast 
the deciding vote, Justice Breyer reasoned in his controlling opinion that 
unlike the displays in  McCreary , the Texas monument, in its particular 
historical context and physical setting, conveyed a predominately secular 
message – a message about the Ten Commandments’ historical signifi cance 
and their importance to secular morality . 58 
 The Supreme Court’s nuanced decisions in this area have elicited criti-
cisms from both sides, but they have effected something of a culture-war 
compromise. Traditional and tempered religious displays may be permit-
ted, but stark endorsements of religion typically are not. As a result, the 
government can celebrate America’s religious heritage and culture to a 
degree, but religious minorities and nonbelievers are protected from more 
fl agrant affronts to their religious or irreligious sensibilities . 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
 Public Aid to Religious Schools and Organizations 
 The Supreme Court’s seminal Establishment Clause decision from the 1940s, 
 Everson v. Board of Education , also was the modern court’s fi rst encounter with 
a public aid controversy. As noted earlier, the court narrowly approved the 
particular program before it, which extended bus-fare reimbursement to 
students attending Roman Catholic schools. At the same time, however, 
the justices used strongly separationist language, signaling that the clause 
would be construed to impose signifi cant limitations on fi nancial support 
for religious benefi ciaries . The court did not return to the public aid context 
for twenty years, but, since then, it has considered numerous challenges. 
Moreover, unlike in its public school and religious symbolism cases, the 
court’s stance in this context has shifted dramatically over time. 
 In a series of cases in the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court approved 
some public aid programs, but it invalidated others. The court’s jurispru-
dence was muddled and depended on fi ne distinctions. Nevertheless, it 
appeared to refl ect, in part, the belief that government and religion should 
be confi ned to their own, separate realms, thereby protecting the autonomy 
and vitality of each. Indeed, in its invalidation of various programs, the 
court sometimes appeared to adopt a strong and categorical interpretation 
of its separationist language in  Everson , which had declared that the gov-
ernment cannot “pass laws which aid one religion [or] all religions” and 
that “no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
  58  Id. at 698–706 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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religious activities or institutions.” 59  During this period, the court also 
adopted and applied an infl uential constitutional test, drawn from its 1971 
decision in  Lemon v. Kurtzman , 60 which invalidated programs that reim-
bursed religious schools for various educational expenses. Under this test, a 
statute (or other governmental action) was required to satisfy each of three 
requirements: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion . . . ; fi nally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion .’” 61 
 The high-water mark of public aid separationism, and, it seems, its last 
hurrah, was in two 1985 decisions.  In  School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball 62 
and  Aguilar v. Felton , 63 the court, applying the  Lemon test, ruled that the 
Establishment Clause barred publicly paid teachers from providing secu-
lar, remedial education on the premises of primary and secondary religious 
schools. The challenged programs extended to religious and nonreligious 
schools alike, and the court found that they had the purpose of supporting 
secular education. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the challenged 
program in  Grand Rapids impermissibly advanced the “sectarian enter-
prise” of the religious schools because the aid was “direct and  substantial.” 
The court also was concerned that the publicly funded teachers might 
knowingly or unwittingly “conform their instruction to the environment 
in which they teach” and that the children attending the schools might per-
ceive a “symbolic union of church and state.” 64 In  Aguilar , the challenged 
program included a system of governmental monitoring to ensure that the 
remedial classes and therefore the aid would remain entirely secular, both 
in reality and in perception. That very system of monitoring, however, led 
the court to fi nd an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 
In a dissenting opinion that foreshadowed the jurisprudential change that 
was to follow, then-Justice Rehnquist lamented the “Catch-22” that he 
believed the court had created . 65 
 In the years since 1985, the Supreme Court, infl uenced by the appoint-
ment of more conservative justices, has embraced a considerably more 
relaxed approach in this setting, much as it has adopted a more relaxed 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, the court’s free exercise 
  59  Everson v. Board of Education , 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). 
  60  403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
  61  Id. at 612–13. 
  62  473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
  63  473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
  64  Grand Rapids , 473 U.S. at 388, 390, 396. 
  65  Aguilar , 473 U.S. at 420–1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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shift, exemplifi ed by  Employment Division v. Smith , has been mirrored in the 
public aid context by a similar emphasis on neutrality as the critical touch-
stone of constitutional analysis. Accordingly, the court has retreated from 
its earlier, separationist decisions, ruling that the government generally is 
free to provide aid to religious benefi ciaries under programs that extend 
“neutrally” to religious and nonreligious recipients alike. In its 1988 deci-
sion in  Bowen v. Kendrick , 66 for instance, the court permitted Congress to 
include religious organizations as grant recipients in a funding program 
designed to address teenage sexuality, as long as the grants were confi ned 
to secular activities . 
 In  Bowen , the court distinguished  Grand Rapids and  Aguilar , but those 
decisions were becoming increasingly tenuous. By 1997, the court was 
prepared to overrule them outright, and so it did in  Agostini v. Felton . 67 
In  Agostini , the court approved exactly what it had rejected twelve years 
earlier: the use of publicly paid teachers to provide secular, remedial educa-
tion at religious schools. Three years later, in  Mitchell v. Helms , 68 the court 
likewise approved a program that provided federally funded computers 
and other instructional equipment and materials to primary and secondary 
schools, religious as well as nonreligious, with the amount of aid depen-
dent on the number of students at each school. In so doing, the court over-
ruled additional precedents from the earlier, more separationist period. As 
the court explained in  Agostini , it now is strongly inclined to uphold aid 
that “is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor 
nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secu-
lar benefi ciaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.” According to the court, 
such programs respect religious freedom, if not separation, because they do 
not “give aid recipients any incentive to modify their religious beliefs or 
 practices” in order to qualify . 69 
 The court has been especially approving of neutral funding programs 
that support religious organizations indirectly, through voucher or sim-
ilar programs under which aid fl ows initially to individuals and reaches 
religious organizations only if individual recipients, as a matter of private 
choice, elect to use it there. Chief Justice Rehnquist played an infl uential 
role in this setting, writing a series of majority opinions that culminated 
in the court’s 2002 school voucher decision. In  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris , 70 
  66  487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
  67  521 U.S. 203, 235–6 (1997). 
  68  530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
  69  Agostini , 521 U.S. at 231, 232. 
  70  536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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the court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a voucher pro-
gram that provided substantial tuition support for low-income parents, 
who could use the support at religious as well as nonreligious schools. The 
program was formally nondiscriminatory, but more than 90 percent of the 
vouchers were being used at religious schools. Even so, the court upheld 
the program, suggesting that nondiscriminatory programs of indirect aid 
promote religious liberty and are virtually immune from Establishment 
Clause invalidation, even if individuals disproportionately direct their ben-
efi ts to religious destinations. As long as a program of indirect aid is neu-
trally drawn and is “a program of true private choice” that is not “skewed” 
to favor religious organizations, the court wrote, the program “is not read-
ily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.” 71 The court 
emphasized that it had never invalidated such a program, and it implied 
that it never would . 
 Some constitutional limits remain, at least for now, on direct aid pro-
grams. The most important restriction is that direct aid, even under neu-
trally drawn programs, cannot support religious activities as such. It must 
be segregated and confi ned to secular uses. For example, the government 
can directly provide religious schools with computers and secular text-
books, but it cannot provide them with Bibles. Conversely, this restriction 
does not apply to indirect aid. As  Zelman makes clear, the ultimate des-
tination of indirect aid is beside the point, as long as the program itself 
is neutral. Thus, there is no need to segregate indirect aid, including the 
proceeds of vouchers, to uses that are secular in nature. 
 The court’s increasingly permissive stance concerning public aid, 
both direct and indirect, laid the constitutional groundwork for fund-
ing religious organizations that provide social services addressing such 
problems as poverty, crime, and drug addiction.  During the presidency 
of Bill Clinton, Congress enacted a limited program called “Charitable 
Choice .”  The inclusion of religious organizations in social-services fund-
ing was expanded and promoted through the “Faith-Based Initiative” 
of President George W. Bush, and it has continued in a different form 
with the support of President Barack Obama . A number of states have 
adopted similar programs. Under prevailing constitutional law, these 
programs, which extend neutrally to religious and nonreligious groups 
alike, probably are permissible as long as direct grants are confi ned to 
secular services. And  Zelman strongly supports the constitutionality of 
another aspect of these initiatives, the funding of vouchers that recipients 
can use at providers of their choice, even if some of the providers offer 
religiously oriented services . 
  71  Id. at 649–53. 
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 THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND DISCRIMINATORY 
FUNDING EXCLUSIONS 
 One question left unresolved by  Zelman was whether the government even 
retains the constitutional  option of excluding religious organizations from 
programs of indirect funding for privately provided education or social ser-
vices. This issue arises not under the Establishment Clause, but under the 
Free Exercise Clause.  As explained earlier, the Supreme Court, despite the 
restrictive approach of  Employment Division v. Smith , has continued to insist 
that laws targeting religion for discriminatory disadvantage trigger strict 
free exercise scrutiny and probable invalidation.  There was a credible argu-
ment that this reasoning would extend to indirect funding programs that 
discriminate against religion by precluding recipients from choosing reli-
gious options . An argument along these lines persuaded the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 72 but a seven-justice Supreme Court major-
ity, in yet another opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed the Ninth 
Circuit in  Locke v. Davey , 73 decided in 2004. 
 In  Locke , the court considered a State of Washington program that pro-
vided scholarships to students at public and private colleges, but that 
denied the scholarships to otherwise eligible students at religious col-
leges if they were majoring in devotional theology, typically to prepare 
for careers in the ministry. The state relied on a provision in Washington’s 
state constitution, which mandated a stronger separation of church and 
state than that required by the First Amendment. Declaring that there is 
room for “play in the joints” between the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses, 74 the Supreme Court permitted the state’s antiestablishment pol-
icy to  prevail. The court asserted that the burden on religious exercise was 
relatively minor, and it rejected strict scrutiny in favor of a far more lenient 
balancing approach. Under that approach, the state’s denial of funding was 
 justifi ed by historical antiestablishment concerns about taxpayer-supported 
clergy, concerns that were refl ected in a number of state constitutions. Read 
narrowly,  Locke might be limited to the selective denial of funding for the 
devotional religious work and training of clergy and other religious profes-
sionals. Conversely, and perhaps more likely, it might permit the govern-
ment to exclude religious benefi ciaries in other contexts as well, including 
voucher programs of all sorts. If so, then  Zelman and  Locke , taken together, 
leave the inclusion or exclusion of religious benefi ciaries largely to the 
 discretion of Congress and the states . 
  72  Davey v. Locke , 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
  73  540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
  74  Id. at 718. 
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 RELIGION, LAW, AND POLITICS 
 This essay has focused on religion’s direct interaction with government 
and law in the contemporary period, especially in connection with First 
Amendment and related legal claims. More broadly, religion has played an 
important role in other political and legal developments, many of which 
are discussed elsewhere in this volume. In the presidential election of 1960, 
Americans for the fi rst time elected a Roman Catholic, John F. Kennedy. 
Another progressive achievement, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was 
inspired by the religious vision of Martin Luther King, Jr. More recently, 
in part as a reaction to the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in  Roe v. Wade , 75 
religion has been a prominent feature in conservative politics.  Courted 
strongly by Ronald Reagan and later Republican leaders, religious conser-
vatives have become an important constituency in the Republican Party. 
They have worked to undo the Supreme Court’s protection of abortion 
rights, have protested the destruction of embryos for stem cell research, and 
have resisted the movement toward same-sex marriage .  Even so, progres-
sive religious voices have not disappeared, and Democratic candidates and 
offi cials, including President Barack Obama, have made notable appeals for 
religious support . 
 These broader political and legal developments are not entirely discon-
nected from the First Amendment. Much to the contrary, that amendment, 
as construed by the Supreme Court, sets the outer boundaries of religious 
politics. In the contemporary period, the court has precluded the adop-
tion of certain governmental policies, including school prayer and starkly 
promotional religious symbolism. By contrast, the court increasingly has 
declared other issues a matter of political choice. Generally speaking, it has 
ruled that the government may, but need not, protect religious conduct 
from nondiscriminatory laws, and that the government may, but need not, 
include religious benefi ciaries in broader funding programs. At the same 
time, the court has strongly protected private religious speech, no less than 
political speech, and it has shown no inclination to confi ne the role of reli-
gious advocacy on political issues. 
 At present, the First Amendment’s constraints on religion-related pol-
icy making are relatively limited, at least as compared to those imposed by 
the court from the 1960s to the 1980s. But the justices have been deeply 
divided in many of their recent decisions. Moreover, as the history of the last 
half-century reveals, the Supreme Court’s positions are not static. The court 
responds to political and cultural changes even as its decisions themselves 
infl uence those developments. This cycle of change is certain to continue . 
  75  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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